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T his paper develops a framework to test alternative market 
microstructure models o f the bid-ask spread. If, on the one hand, 
information-based models result in bid and ask quotes that arc 
non-Markovian, on the other hand, the Markov property may 
hold in equilibrium settings where the market maker serves as 
an intermediary. W e thus derive a simple nonparametric test for 
Markovian dynam ics, suitable to high frequency data, so as to 
address the merits o f information-based and equilibrium models. 
Finally, we exam ine whether or not bid-ask spreads follow Markov 






















































































































































































Information-based models in the market microstructure literature use 
adverse selection arguments to show how, even in competitive markets 
without explicit transaction costs, bid-ask spreads would exist. The main 
intuition behind these models dates back to Baghehot (1971), who claims 
that the market maker sets a bid-ask spread to balance losses on trades 
with insider (or informed) agents with gains on trades with liquidity 
(or uninformed) traders. This framework allows for the examination of 
market dynamics and hence provides insights into the adjustment pro­
cess of prices. Easley and O ’Hara (1992) are the first to delineate the 
link between the existence of information, the timing of trades and the 
stochastic processes of the bid and ask prices. In particular, because time 
is not exogenous to the formation of prices, bid and ask quotes cannot 
follow Markov processes.
Another way to explain the existence of bid-ask spreads rests on 
equilibrium models. Amaro de Matos and Rosdrio (2000) extend the 
framework of Platen and Rebolledo (1996) to introduce intermediation 
in financial markets. Taking advantage of their market power, the market 
makers set bid-ask spreads in order to maximize their profits. According 
to the nature of the demand and supply processes for the underlying 



























































































This paper develops a nonparametric test for the Markov property 
that is particularly suitable to high frequency data, essential to empiri­
cal microstructure studies (Goodhart and O ’Hara, 1997). This allows for 
testing the Markovian nature of the bid and ask prices so as to address 
the relative merits of information-based and equilibrium models. Any 
evidence supporting a Markovian character of bid and ask prices invali­
dates information-based models, though it is consistent with equilibrium 
models. In contrast, rejecting the Markov property does not rule out 
equilibrium models as interpretative tools. Indeed, these models could 
also generate non-Markovian processes for the bid and ask prices.
An empirical application is performed using data from five stocks 
actively traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), namely Boe­
ing, Coca-Cola, Disney, Exxon, and IBM. This market has been chosen 
since it is well known for strong adverse selection costs as opposed, for 
instance, to the London Stock Exchange (Snell and Tonks, 1998). In 
that sense, not rejecting the null hypothesis of the Markov property with 
these data provides credible evidence against information-based models. 
The results indicate that the Markov assumption is consistent with the 
Coca-Cola, Disney and Exxon bid-ask spreads, whereas the converse is 
true for Boeing and IBM.




























































































describes the differences between the asymmetric information and general 
equilibrium approaches to modeling the bid-ask spread. It turns out that 
the main testable distinction refers to whether or not the bid-ask spread 
follows a Markov process. Section 3 starts by discussing how to design 
a nonparametric test for Markovian dynamics which is suitable to high 
frequency data. Next, we show the asymptotic normality of the test 
statistic both under the null hypothesis that the Markov property holds 
and under a sequence of local alternatives. Section 4 applies the above 
ideas to the NYSE high-frequency data to test for adverse selection. 
Section 5 summarizes the results and offers some concluding remarks. 
For ease of exposition, we collect all proofs and technical lemmas in the 
appendix.
2 Market microstructure models
2.1 Information-based models
To concentrate on the effect of information on prices, Easley and O ’Hara 
(1992) assume a single market maker who is risk neutral and acts compet­
itively. The first characteristic rules out direct inventory effects, whilst 
the latter implies the existence of at least potential competitors. Let V 
denote the value of a certain asset and define an information event as 




























































































two values, L and / / ,  with probabilities <5 > 0 and 1 — d >  0. The ex­
pected value of the asset conditional on the signal is E(V \ip — L) =  Vi 
or E(V  | ip =  H) =  Vu. If no information event occurs (ip — 0), then 
the expected value of the asset simply remains at its unconditional level 
V. =  6Vl +  (1 -  6)V„.
Information events occur with probability a e  (0,1) before the 
start of the current trading day. This uncertainty reflects the fact that, 
since uninformed market participants do not receive any signals, they 
may also not know whether any new information even exists (e.g. Dow- 
Jones Rumor Wire). Trade can arise from uninformed and/or informed 
traders. To keep the focus on information effects, Easley and O ’Hara 
assume that the informed traders are risk neutral and price takers so as 
to rule out strategic behavior. As such, the resulting trading strategy 
reads: If a high signal occurs, an insider will buy the stock if the current 
quote is below Vu\ if a low signal occurs, then he will sell if the quote is 
above V/.
To avoid no-trade equilibria, some uninformed market participants 
must trade for non-speculative reasons such as liquidity needs or portfolio 
considerations. Further, suppose that there is a fraction 7 of potential 
sellers and a fraction 1 — 7 of potential buyers among liquidity traders. 




























































































seller’s trading probability is es-
The assumptions of risk neutrality and competitive behavior for 
the market maker dictate that price quotes yield zero expected profit 
conditional on a trade at the quote. As insider traders will profit at the 
market maker’s expense, the probability // e (0, 1) that a trade is actu­
ally information-based is crucial for determining the price quotes. There 
are several ways to interpret fi: e.g. fraction of the trader population 
observing the signal, probability of information disclosure to the selected 
trader, and exogenous order arrival rate.
Insiders always trade provided that prices are not at their full in­
formation value, whereas liquidity traders may buy, sell or not trade 
according to their type (buyer or seller) and motivation. Therefore, non­
trading occurs only when an uninformed trader checks the quotes and 
decides for portfolio reasons (as captured by en and es ) not to trade. This 
can happen both when there has been an information event and when 
there has not. Of course, no-trade outcomes are more likely to occur 
when there is no new information than when new information arrives:
(1 -  7)(1 -  eB) +  7(1 -  es) > (1 -  A*)[(l -  7)(1 -  en) +  7(1 -  es)]- (1) 
The tree diagram in Figure 1 summarizes the trading process.
The market maker knows the structure of the market and updates 




























































































and thus prices, to adjust. The quote-setting process for the first trade of 
the day unfolds as follows. To determine the evolution of beliefs, notice 
that there is no need to keep track of the order in which sales, buys and 
no-trades arrive in the market. Suppose, for instance, that in the past 
t trading intervals there were nt no-trades, j3t buys, and st sales. Then,
(nt,p t,s t) is a sufficient statistic for Q£. For instance, the probability 
the market maker assigns to the absence of new information given this 
trading history reads
Pr(V' =  ü|QI) =  (1 -  a )(7es )Sl[(l -  7 )eB]A {(1  -  c*)(7«s)3‘ [(l -  7)eB]A
+ (1 -  n)nt + (1 -  /i)7 es )3,((l -  n){ 1 -  7 )tBf '
+ « (1 -<5)((1-/x)7€Sr ( ^ + ( l - ^ ( 1 -7)efl)/3‘]} 1
More importantly, as beliefs depend on st), quotes will also depend
on these quantities. In particular, the bid and ask prices at time t +  1 
can be written as
bt+1 =  Pr(î/> =  L \nt,Pt,st +  1)VT +  Pr(^> =  0 \nt,p t,s t +  1)K
+  Pi(ip =  H I nt, /3t,s t +  l)Vn (2)
u£+i =  Pr{ip =  L\nt,Pt +  l,St)VL +  Pi{il) =  Q\nt,p t +  l ,s t)V,
+ Pr(ip =  H \nt, 0t + l,«t)Vjsr, (3)
respectively.




























































































most recent quote, but also on the total numbers of previous buys, sales 
and no-trade outcomes. This means that they do not satisfy the Markov 
property as opposed to the process of trade outcomes (nt,(3t, st).
2.2 Equilibrium Models
A different approach for explaining the behavior of the bid-ask spread 
rests on financial market equilibrium conditions in the presence of fi­
nancial intermediation. The main duty of market makers is to provide 
liquidity (O ’Hara, 1995). Taking advantage of their access to superior 
information on the trade orders, the market makers set different prices 
for buys and sells so as to profit from the spread.
Amaro de Matos and Rosàrio (2000) begin by specifying the stochas­
tic processes for the demand and supply of a financial asset as in Platen 
and Rebolledo (1996). In the absence of intermediation, the demand 
process reads
D (t,pt,pd) =  a t -  Pdpt +  7 dPt, (4)
where (a , (3d, 7d) > 0, pt is the security’s price and pd denotes the cumu­
lative demand. The linear trend accounts for a deterministic amount of 
the security that is traded.




























































































namics of pd obey the following stochastic differentia] equation
dp? =  \d(pt - p t)dt +a?{p t)dW t, (5)
where Xd is non-negative, so as to reflect investors’ desire to buy low and 
sell high. The price pt corresponds to the risk-neutral valuation of the 
security. The model’s source of noise is a standard Brownian motion Wt 
associated with a diffusion function o f (p() that may depend on the price 
Pt and time t. Notice moreover that it is this particular specification of 
pd that determines the Markovian nature of the demand process.
The supply process is modeled in a similar way to the demand, viz.
S {t,p t,p\) =  a t  + P3pt +  Y p 3t, (6)
where 7^) >  0 and the cumulative supply p\ follows
dp\ =  A3{pt - p t)dt +  a‘t (pt) dWt. (7)
In the absence of intermediation, the market-clearing condition impos­
ing the equality between the demand and supply processes determines a 
single price governed by a Markov process as in Platen and Rebolledo 
(1996).
The presence of M  market makers implies that the demand and 
supply do not interact directly. In fact, intermediaries use their market 




























































































therefore sell at a price at such that qt = D (t, at, p{  ̂ and buy at a price 
bt satisfying qt =  5  (t , bt, p\). A market maker then maximizes the profit 
function
V(qt) =  max (at -  bt) -  K (gt)], 0}. (8)
Assuming a positive, increasing cost function of the form K(qt) =  cq +
ciqt+c2q?, Amaro de Matos and Rosario (2000) show that, in equilibrium,
the bid and ask prices are, respectively
a ( A - p d - p s) ± [A +  { M -  l)Pd -  p ’ ]-yd d 
°* =  Pd [A +  (M  — 1) (/3d +  p ) ) t +  Pd[A +  {M -  1) (pd +  /?■’ )] Pt 
M/3dY  , MciPdPa
~ Pd [A +  (M -  1) {pd +  £■)] Pt + pd [A+ ( M -  1) {pd +  /?■’ )] ’
, =  a ( A - p d- p a) m P 'Y  a
t p’ [A+(M - l ) (pd + p>)] p*[A + (M - 1) (Pd + P')} Pt 
[A + {M -  1 )PS -  Pd] Y  s MC\Pdps
~ Pa [A + (M — 1) {pd +  p*)] Pt ~ p’ [A + {M -  l)(Pd + P')]'
where A =  2(/3d +  P’  +  c2PdP’ )■ In particular, this implies that the bid- 
ask spread will follow a diffusion process. It is interesting to note that, 
in the limit case where the number of market makers is arbitrarily large 
(M  —» oo), the bid-ask spread is constant and equal to q .
3 Testing for Markovian dynamics
Despite the innumerable studies rooted in Markov processes, there are 




























































































and Fernandes and Flores (1999). To build a nonpararaetric testing pro­
cedure, the first uses the fact that the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation 
must hold in order for a Markov process compatible with the data to 
exist. If, on the one hand, the Chapman-Kolmogorov representation in­
volves a quite complicated nonlinear functional relationship among tran­
sition probabilities of the process, on the other hand, it brings about 
several advantages. First, estimating transition distributions is straight­
forward and does not require any prior parameterization of conditional 
moments. Second, a test based on the whole transition density is obvi­
ously preferable to tests based on specific conditional moments. Third, 
the Chapman-Kolmogorov representation is well defined, even within a 
multivariate context.
Fernandes and Flores (1999) develop alternative ways of testing 
whether discretely recorded observations are consistent with an under­
lying Markov process. Instead of using the highly nonlinear functional 
characterization provided by the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation, they 
rely on a simple characterization out of a set of necessary conditions for 
Markov models. As in Ait-Sahalia (1997), the testing strategy boils down 
to measuring the closeness of density functionals which are nonparamet- 
rically estimated by kernel-based methods.




























































































(J5J6p s n */?/0
imates the market reality, one may apply the above testing'rjjrocejdures 
to check whether the bid-ask spread follows a Markov process. 
these tests are built under the assumption that the data are equally 
spaced in time, which does not hold for high frequency data. As such, 
market microstructure analyses call for a nonparametric test of the Markov 
assumption, which is suitable to data irregularly spaced in time. For that 
purpose, we build on the theory of subordinated Markov processes in 
which a continuous-time strong Markov process is observed only when it 
crosses some discrete level. Such a sampling scheme accommodates not 
only the irregular spacing of transaction data, but also price discreteness.
Let ti (i =  1 ,2 , . . .)  denote the observation times of the continuous­
time price process [X t, t, > 0} and assume that tn =  0. Suppose further 
that the shadow price follows a strong Markov process. To account for 
price discreteness, we assume that prices are observed only when the 
cumulative change in the shadow price is at least c, say a basic tick. The 
price duration then reads
di+i =  ti+1 -  U =  inf -  X t{\ > c} . (9)
The data available for statistical inference are the discrete realizations of 
the price process Xn), where X { =  X t. , and their correspondent
durations (di, . . . ,  dn).
































































































ing stopping times of the continuous-time Markov process { X (, t >  0}, 
hence the discrete-time process {X*, i =  1 ,2 , . . . }  satisfies the Markov 
property as well. Further, the duration dj+i between t;+1 and t; is a mea­
surable function of the path of { X t, 0 < U < t <  ti+i } ,  and thus depends 
on the information available at time ti only through Xi, i.e. d, _LL dj \ Xi 
for every 0 <  j  < i in the notation of Dawid (1979). Therefore, we test 
the Markov assumption by checking the property of conditional indepen­
dence between consecutive durations given the current price realization.
The null hypothesis of conditional independence implied by the 
Markov character of the price process then reads
H0 : fix j{a i,x ,a 2) -  fi\x{ai)fxj(x,a2) &.S., (10)
where fixj, fi\x and fx j  denote the joint density of (d,, X t, dj), the condi­
tional density of d{ given X, and the joint density of (X), dj), respectively. 
To keep the nonparametric nature of the testing procedure, we employ 
kernel smoothing to estimate both the right- and left-hand sides of (10). 
Next, it suffices to gauge how well the density restriction in (10) fits the 
data by the means of some discrepancy measure.
For the sake o f simplicity, we consider the mean squared difference, 
yielding the following test statistic




























































































The sample analog is then
j  n - i + j
A; — : ■ r y !  \ f i x j ( d k + i - j ,  X k + i - j ,  dk) g i x j ( d k + i —j , X k + i - j j d k ) ]  ,
1 n - i + J  k=l
wYi&tq gixj(.dk+i—ji dk) ft\x(,dk+i—jl-^fc+t—j)fxj(.^k+i— j, dk)- Any
other evaluation of the integral on the right-hand side of ( 11) can be used.
At first glance, deriving the limiting distribution of A y  seems to 
involve a number of complex steps since one must deal with the cross- 
correlation among fixj, fi\x and fx j-  Happily, the fact that the rates 
of convergence of the three estimators are different simplifies things sub­
stantially. In particular, fix j converges slower than f t\x and fx j  due to 
its higher dimensionality. As such, estimating the conditional density 
fi|x and the joint density fx j  does not play a role in the asymptotic 
behavior of the test statistic. The following proposition uses the tools 
provided by A'it-Sahalia (1994) to demonstrate the asymptotic normality 
of the standardized test statistic.
P roposition  1: For u,v € 1R3, define ex  =  f  K 2(u)du and vx =  
f  [ /  K(u)K (u + v) d«]2 dv. Under the null and suitable regularity condi­
tions (Ait-Sahalia, 1994), the statistic
=
nblJ 2Af -  b„'/2Sa
o\
1V(0, 1),
where bn =  b2d n bxn is the bandwidth for the kernel estimation of the joint 
density fixj, and Sa and o\ are consistent estimates of Sa =  ex  F (fixj) 




























































































Consider now the following sequence of local alternatives
H["] : sup I f\xj(ai,x,a2) — fljx,(01,1,02) — e„£(ai, x, 02)| =  o(en),
( 12)
where | f\x\ -  f lXj\ =  o (n - 16~1/2) ,  e„ =  n_1/26~1/4 and £(■, -, •) is such 
that E[i(a.i,x,u.'z)] =  0 and £2 =  E[£2(a1, x, a2)] < 00. The next result 
illustrates the fact that the testing procedure entails nontrivial power 
under local alternatives that shrink to the null at rate en.
P roposition  2: Under the sequence of local alternatives //['^ and as­
sumptions A l to Af, Â„ N (£2/oa,1)-
4 Empirical exercise
We focus on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) data ranging from Septem­
ber to November 1996. In particular, we look at five actively traded 
stocks from the Dow Jones index: Boeing, Coca-Cola, Disney, Exxon, 
and IBM.1 Trading on the NYSE is organized as a combined market 
maker/order book system. A designated specialist composes the market 
for each stock by managing the trading and quoting processes and pro­
viding liquidity. Apart from an opening auction, trading is continuous
from 9:30 to 16:00. Spread durations are defined as the time interval
1 Data were kindly provided by Luc Bauwens and Pierre Giot and refer to the 





























































































needed to observe a change either in the bid or in the ask price.
For all stocks, durations between events recorded outside the reg­
ular opening hours of the NYSE, as well as overnight spells, are re­
moved. As documented by Giot (1999), durations feature a strong time- 
of-day effect related to predetermined market characteristics, such as 
trade opening and closing times and lunch time for traders. To account 
for this anomaly, we also consider seasonally adjusted spread durations 
d\ =  dz/ip(ti), where dz is the original spread duration in seconds and 
</>(•) denotes a time-of-day factor determined by averaging durations over 
thirty-minutes intervals for each day of the week and fitting a cubic spline 
with nodes at each half hour.
The motivation for working with the bid-ask spread rather than 
bid and ask prices is simple. The results reported in Table I show that 
the bid and ask quotes are both integrated of order one, and hence non- 
stationary. In contrast, there is no evidence of unit roots in the bid-ask 
spread process. As kernel density estimation relies on the assumption 
of stationarity, spread data are thus more convenient as input for the 
subsequent analysis.






























































































which implies that e*- =  (47T) -3/2 and vk =  (87t) - 3/2. Bandwidths are 
chosen according to Silverman’s (1986) rule of thumb adjusted so as 
to conform to the required degree of undersmoothing (see Ai't-Sahalia, 
1994).
Table II reports mixed results in the sense that the Markov hypoth­
esis seems to suit only some of the bid-ask spreads under consideration. 
Clear rejection is detected in the Boeing, Coca-Cola and IBM bid-ask 
spreads, indicating that adverse selection may play a role in the forma­
tion of their prices. In contrast, there is no indication of non-Markovian 
behavior in the Disney and Exxon bid-ask spreads. These results agree 
to some extent with Fernandes and Grammig’s (2000) analysis, which 
identifies significant asymmetric information effects only in the Boeing 
and IBM price durations.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a test to check whether information-based 
models of market microstructure fit well data on bid-ask prices as com­
pared to equilibrium models. The testing strategy rests on the fact 
that information-based models result in bid-ask spreads that are non- 
Markovian, whereas the Markov property may hold only in equilibrium 




























































































larly suitable to high frequency data, to test the Markov assumption.
Using data from the New York Stock Exchange, we show that 
whether the Markovian hypothesis is reasonable is indeed an empirical is­
sue. A Markovian character suits the Disney and Exxon bid-ask spreads 
well, thus providing evidence in support of equilibrium models. In con­
trast, the rejection of the Markov assumption for Boeing, Coca-Cola and 






























































































Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the second-order functional Taylor 
expansion o f the test statistic
Af+h =  Af  +  DAf(h) +  ì  D 2Af (h, h) +  O (||/i||3) ,
where h denotes the perturbation h+xj =  fix j — fix j■ Under the null 
hypothesis that fixj =  9ixj, both Af and DA^ equal zero. To appreciate 
the singularity of the latter, it suffices to compute the Gâteaux derivative
of Af}h(\) =  A f+\h with respect to A evaluated at A —1+ 0. Let
, _  /  [fixj +  A A jx j ] (a i ,x, a2)d a 2 J [fixj +  Xhjxj](a\, x, a2)d ai  
9'Xl I  [Uxj +  Xhixj\(ai,x,a2)d(au a2)
It follows then that
dAM (0)
d\ 2 J [fixj — 9iXj][hixj — ^>9iXj]fiXj(ai,x, a2) d(ai, x, a2) 
+  / W  Xj -  9iXj]2hixj(ai,x, a2) d (o i, x, a2),
where Dgixj is the functional derivative of gtxj with respect to fixj, 
namely
hix , hxj hx
D**> ~ \ t x + h T h )  *»■
As is apparent, imposing the null hypothesis induces singularity in the
first functional derivative DA^. It is easy to see that, under the null, the
second-order derivative reads




























































































given that all other terms will depend on fix j~9iX j■ As Dgixj converges 
faster than hixj, the leading term is the one associated with h'fXj. The 
result follows then from the general tools provided by A'ft-Sahalia (1994).
Proof of Proposition 2: The conditions imposed by Ait-Sahalia 
(1994) are such that the functional Taylor expansion under consideration 
is also valid in the double array case (di>n, XiiU, dj,„). It thus ensues that 
under
bl/2 n-i+j 2
r  ^  .j- , A '* t j j.Ti■ dfc)Tl) gixj(dk+i-j,n, X^-Tl—j Ti, dfcjTt)]
*=1
converges weakly to a standard normal distribution under / l nl. The result
p[n]
then follows by noting that d\ — > cr a and
A /W  =  E  [ / [nl(di,„, X itn, dhn) -  gW(di,n, X hn, dj,n)j 2 +  O p ( n -1 ^ )
=  <?nE [e2(dhrl, Xiitl, dj>n)\ +  Op ( n _1 6“ 1/2)
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es - uninformed sells
1 — es'- uninformed seller does not trade 
ejj: uninformed buys
1 — tB- uninformed buyer does not trade
insider buys
es- uninformed sells
1 — es- uninformed seller does not trade 
es- uninformed buys
1 — eg: uninformed buyer does not trade
es- uninformed sells
1 — es- uninformed seller does not trade 
es-  uninformed buys
1 — eg: uninformed buyer does not trade
Figure 1 —  Tree diagram of the trading process
Notation: a  is the probability of an information event, S is the prob­
ability of a low signed, p is the probability that a trade comes from 
an informed trader, 7  is the probability that an uninformed trader is 
a seller, 1 — 7  is the probability that an uninformed trader is a buyer, 
es is the probability that the uninformed trader will sell, and es  is the 
probability that the uninformed trader will buy. Nodes to the left of the 
dotted line occur only at the beginning of the trading day; nodes to the 





























































































Phillips and Perron’s (1988) unit root tests
stock sample size truncation lag test statistic
Boeing ask 6,317 10 -1.6402
bid 6,317 10 -1.6655
spread 6,317 10 -115.3388
Coca-Cola ask 3,823 8 -2.1555
bid 3,823 8 -2.1615
spread 3,823 8 -110.2846
Disney ask 5,801 9 -1.2639
bid 5,801 9 -1.2318
spread 5,801 9 -112.1909
Exxon ask 6,009 9 -0.6694
bid 6,009 9 -0.6405
spread 6,009 9 -121.8439
IBM ask 15,124 12 -0.2177
bid 15,124 12 -0.2124
spread 15,124 12 -163.0558
Both ask and bid prices are in logs, whereas the spread refers to the differ­
ence of the logarithms of the ask and bid prices. The truncation lag l  of 
the Newey and West’s (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consis­
tent estimate of the spectrum at zero frequency is based on the automatic 




























































































T W e  I I
Nonparametric tests of the Markov property
stock duration adjusted duration
A„ p-value A„ p-value
Boeing 3.2935 (0.0005) 5.0327 (0.0000)
Coca-Cola 19.4971 (0.0000) 17.9364 (0.0000)
Disney -2.5783 (0.9950) -1.6367 (0.9491)
Exxon -0.5484 (0.7083) 1.3966 (0.0813)
IBM 21.2064 (0.0000) 17.9247 (0.0000)
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